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Abstract A global signaling game is a sender-receiver game in which the
sender is only imperfectly informed about the receiver’s preferences. The pa-
per considers an economically relevant class of signaling games that possess
more than one Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. For this class of games, it is
shown that a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is unaffected by a small perturba-
tion of the information structure if and only if it is consistent with a criterion
suggested by Cho and Kreps (1987). Moreover, the equilibrium in the global
signaling game is essentially unique.
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1. Introduction
The economic notion of signaling, as introduced by Spence (1973), refers to a
specific situation of asymmetric information in which an informed and first-
moving agent, the sender, seeks to influence the subsequent decision of an
a priori uninformed observer, the receiver. The literature has worked so far
under the assumption that the preferences of the receiver are common knowl-
edge. However, this assumption may not be satisfied under all circumstances.
E.g. in the example of educational signaling, it is hard to imagine that future
wage levels can be predicted with absolute certainty. For another example,
consider a firm that pays dividends to stock holders to signal future prof-
itability. Such a firm will not always be certain about the marginal tax rate
of the average equity owner. Finally, and closer to the current framework,
an incumbent monopolist adhering to limit pricing will typically only be im-
perfectly informed about the profitability of market entry for an outsider. It
should be clear that this list of examples could be continued without much
difficulty. Thus, there appear to exist some settings of interest in which the
sender of an economically relevant signal is uncertain about the preferences
of the party that receives the signal.
From a methodological point of view, the introduction of incomplete informa-
tion has proven to be of significant value. Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
have shown that in two-by-two coordination games, a unique prediction of
the risk dominant equilibrium is feasible when the game is embedded into a
global payoff manifold, and when the information structure is only slightly
perturbed. The underlying theory has recently created a number of inter-
esting economic applications. Morris and Shin (1998), for example, show
that the introduction of incomplete information yields a unique prediction
concerning the outcome of a coordination problem between a continuum of
foreign exchange traders. This allows to derive unprecedented comparative
statics results, e.g. analyzing the consequences of a Tobin tax on currency
speculation. This and other recent applications of global games, as surveyed
by Morris and Shin (2003), have in common that the number of equilibria in
a given game is significantly reduced by eliminating the coordination prob-
lem between a population of agents that make their decision virtually at the
same moment of time.
Also the notorious multiplicity of equilibria in signaling games, while not
always considered from this perspective, is due to a coordination problem
between players that move at the same stage. Early studies in this field
resolved the coordination problem by imposing “plausible” beliefs at infor-
mation sets that remain unreached in equilibrium. Cho and Kreps (1987), for
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example, have suggested the Intuitive Criterion requiring that the receiver in
a signaling game, after observing an unexpected deviation from equilibrium
play, should assign probability zero to all those sender types that, by devi-
ating like that, cannot improve their respective payoff, provided the receiver
makes some utility-maximizing choice of response. However, this and sim-
ilar concepts, while a formal consequence of Kohlberg and Mertens’ (1986)
strategic stability, have been criticised for not being derivable from more
general principles of belief formation in extensive-form games.1
Given this background, it appeared to us as not unreasonable to apply the
global games methodology to signaling games. In fact, when globality is
interpreted in a sufficiently broad sense, then we are not the very first to do
so. Carlsson and Dasgupta (1997) have considered informational robustness
of equilibria in signaling games. In contrast to this paper, however, Carlsson
and Dasgupta study informational perturbation in which the receiver obtains
an imperfect signal of the sender’s message. This assumption turns out to
have a considerable power: It is shown that the set of noise-proof equilibria
is strictly contained in the set of equilibria that survive the never-a-weak-
best-reply criterion.
In this paper, we study the stability of signaling equilibria with respect to in-
formational perturbations concerning the receiver’s preferences. This means
considering games of two-sided incomplete information where in addition to
the usual uncertainty about the sender’s type, there is incomplete informa-
tion about the receiver’s preferences. We consider a robust class of simple
signaling games based on the well known beer-quiche game (Cho and Kreps,
1987) with two sender types, two possible responses, and a continuum of
receiver types. For this class of games, we find that a Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium is informationally stable in the suggested way if and only if it is
consistent with the Intuitive Criterion.
The easier part of this result is to show that an informationally stable Per-
fect Bayesian Equilibrium must be consistent with the Criterion. In fact,
it turns out that this direction can be shown using the established method-
ologies from the theory of global games. Specifically, the argument begins
with the insight that the receiver possesses a dominant strategy when her
preferences are sufficiently extreme. The desired result then follows from it-
erated dominance eliminations. The second part of the claim, vz. that any
equilibrium consistent with the Criterion is informationally stable, requires
1This critique is at least partly refuted by Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002), who for-
malize epistemic conditions for the Intuitive Criterion.
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to find a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in the global game. This task turns
out to be somewhat more intricate. The key step in the proof is to relate
the set of equilibria in the global signaling game to the set of equilibria in
a global two-by-two (non-coordination) normal-form game. A general result
by Milgrom and Weber (1985) then guarantees existence of the equilibrium
in the static game and closes the argument.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we discuss an
example neglecting technicalities for the purpose of accessibility. In Section
3, the general setup is introduced. Section 3 also contains the statement
and proof of our first main result, that links informational stability to the
Intuitive Criterion. Section 4 discusses uniqueness properties. In Section 5,
we prove existence of the equilibrium. In Section 6 we solely focus on the
example from Section 2 and explicitly construct an equilibrium for a certain
range of information structures. Section 7 concludes. Technical steps of the
proofs are gathered in the appendix.
2. An example
In this section, we will illustrate our main results using a global version of
a game introduced by Cho and Kreps (1987). See Figure 1 for a graphical
representation of the game tree. - place
Figure
1
here -
There are two players, Player 1 (the sender) and Player 2 (the receiver). The
game has four stages. In the initial stage of the game, Nature determines
both the type t ∈ T of Player 2, and the type of Player 1, composed of a
preference parameter θ ∈ {θ, θ} and an imperfect signal t˜ about Player 2’s
type. We will assume for concreteness that the probability of θ is given by
p = 0.9, and that the conditional distribution of t˜ is uniform on [t− ε, t + ε],
where ε > 0. In the second stage, Player 1 observes θ and t˜ and chooses a
message m ∈ {m,m}. In the third stage, Player 2 observes her type t and
the message m, but neither the sender’s type θ nor the imperfect signal t˜,
and chooses a response r ∈ {r, r}. Finally, payoffs are determined according
to utility functions u1(m, r, θ) and u2(r, θ, t) as shown in Figure 1.
As can be seen from this specification, the global signaling game differs from
a signaling game in that the preferences of the receiver are only imperfectly
observable for the sender.
We denote the global games version of the signaling game by G(ε). The error
parameter ε captures the degree to which the sender possesses incomplete
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information about the receiver. In the limit case, i.e. for ε = 0, the sender
is perfectly informed about the receiver’s type t. Thus, once t has been
determined by nature, a signaling game, referred to as Gt(0), is played. We
will show that for ε sufficiently small, and for t˜ close to 0, the sender chooses
the message m with probability one for both possible values of θ. Notice that
this outcome, i.e. pooling on m, is predicted in the local game G0(0) by the
Intuitive Criterion.
We begin the analysis of the example by showing that, given our setting,
Player 1θ (the high type of Player 1) will choose m for a wide range of
signals t˜. This finding is independent of ε and, thus, already upsets the m
pooling equilibrium. The initial dominance argument is to note that for very
low values of the preference parameter t, Player 2 has a dominant strategy.
What matters for the argument is the response to message m.
Fact 1. For t < −1, Player 2m chooses r.
The next step is to analyze the decision of Player 1 when confronted with a
very low signal. For this, assume that it is already shown for some t∗ that for
any t < t∗, Player 2m responds with r. This assumption has been verified
for t∗ = −1 so far. Consider now a signal t˜ < t∗ for Player 1θ. Because noise
is symmetric, Player 1’s posterior then entails that Player 2m will choose r
with probability less than 1/2. In this case, however, the message m promises
a payoff to Player 1θ that is strictly larger than 2, so that, in expected terms,
m is strictly better than m for Player 1θ. We summarize the argument as
follows:
Fact 2. Assume that for all t < t∗, Player 2m chooses r. Then for any
t˜ < t∗, Player 1θ will choose m.
Consider now the posterior of Player 2m. Assume that Player 1θ plays m for
all values t˜ < t∗, for some fixed value t∗. Let Player 2m be of type t < t∗ + ε.
Given such t, Player 2 knows that the probability of Player 1 receiving a
signal t˜ < t∗ is strictly positive. By assumption, Player 1 chooses m for all
values t˜ < t∗. Thus, Player 2m assigns some strictly positive probability to
θ = θ.
More can be said about Player 2m’s posterior. As Player 1’s preferences
exhibit increasing differences with respect to θ and m, Player 2 can infer
that whenever 1θ has a weak preference for m, 1θ has a strict preference
for m, given the signal t˜.2 Hence, the posterior of facing a high type θ on
2If p′ is the posterior probability of 1θ playing m, then the posterior probability of 1θ
playing m must be at least p′.
6
message m cannot fall below the prior probability p of the high type. If we
denote the belief of Player 2 about the possible sender of a message m given
her type t by µ(. |m, t), this can be expressed as:
µ(θ | m, t) ≥ p = 0.9.
The expected payoff for Player 2m from r, denoted by pi2(r | m, t), is therefore
bounded from above by
pi2(r | m, t) ≤ (1 + t) · 0.1 + (t− 1) · 0.9.
However, even this upper bound falls below the zero payoff from r whenever
t < 0.8. So we have shown:
Fact 3. Assume that 1θ plays m for all values t˜ < t∗ < 0.8. Then 2m
chooses r for all t < t∗.
Putting the above facts together delivers the result that for any signal t˜ < 0.8,
Player 1θ chooses m. This proves that pooling on m is not an informationally
stable equilibrium of the signaling game G0(0). Note that up to this point
only dominance arguments have been applied.
One can go a bit further and show that any equilibrium in the global game
involves pooling on m for values t˜ < 0.8. To provoke a contradiction, assume
an equilibrium in which 1θ plays m with positive probability in an ε/4-
neighbourhood U of a given t˜ < 0.8 − 2ε. See Figure 2 for illustration. - place
Figure
2
here -
Because the θ type does not choose m in the considered area, Player 2m
assigns probability one to the θ type whenever
t ∈ (t˜− 3ε
4
; t˜ +
3ε
4
). (1)
Thus, for all t satisfying (1), Player 2m certainly responds with r. If we
now consider the expectation of Player 1θ given t˜ ∈ U, we find that she has
to assign a probability larger than 3/4 to a response r against message m.
Hence, Player 1θ would strictly prefer to choose m for all t˜ ∈ U . This yields
the desired contradiction, and we have shown:
Fact 4. In any equilibrium of the global game, Player 1θ must choose m for
all signals t˜ < 0.8− 2ε (and player 1θ must choose m for all t˜ < 0.8).
Thus, for t = 0, only pooling on m followed by r can be an equilibrium in
the global signaling game. We will proceed with the analysis of this example
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in Section 4, where we show that pooling on m is indeed an informationally
stable equilibrium.
3. The general framework
A global signaling game involves two parties, the sender (Player 1), and
the receiver (Player 2). As mentioned before, the modification vis-a`-vis the
text-book signaling game is that the sender has only incomplete information
about the utility function of the receiver. Due to the introduction of a further
move by nature to determine t and t˜, a more complex information structure
arises and the usual notion of types becomes somewhat awkward. Strictly
speaking, a type of Player 1 is a combination
(
θ, t˜
)
. However, for the sake of
convenience, we will refer to θ as Player 1’s global type. Moreover, we will
talk about Player 1θ referring to the global agent θ of Player 1, i.e. Player
1 at her global information set θ. Similarly, we will talk about Player 2m
referring to Player 2 at her global information set m. We will call pairs
(
θ, t˜
)
and (m, t) local information sets of Player 1 and Player 2, respectively.3 We
denote the sets of possible global types and signals for Player 1 by Θ and T˜ ,
and the set of possible types of Player 2 by T . The set of possible messages
for Player 1 is denoted by M and the set of possible responses for Player 2
by R. The only restriction made at this point is that Θ,M and R are all
finite, and that T, T˜ ⊆ R.
The resulting global signaling game, again denoted by G(ε), has four stages.
In the first stage, nature determines a global type and a signal (θ, t˜) ∈ Θ ×
T˜ for Player 1, and a type t ∈ T for Player 2. We will assume that the
pair (t, t˜) and the individual parameter θ are drawn independently, but no
such restrictions will be imposed on the joint distribution of t and t˜.4 The
probability distribution over Θ will be denoted by p(.), the joint distribution
of (t, t˜) by ν. We assume that ν and its marginal distributions are atomless.
The corresponding conditional densities for t˜ and t are assumed to exist, and
denoted by ν(. | t) and ν(. | t˜), respectively. In the second stage, Player 1
observes her global type and her signal and sends a message m(θ, t˜) ∈M . In
stage 3, the receiver observes her own type t and the sender’s message, but
neither her type nor her signal, and chooses a response r(m, t) ∈ R. Finally,
utility is determined by u1(m, r, θ) for the sender, and by u2(r, θ, t) for the
receiver.
3Taking a slightly different perspective
(
θ, t˜
)
can also be viewed as a local type or agent
of Player 1.
4In fact, if t and t˜ are independent, then the sender’s signal is without value, so that
we have a signaling game with uncertain payoff for the receiver.
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It turns out that, in general, existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies is
not obvious (see Section 5), so that some notion of mixed strategy is desir-
able. However, as pointed out by Aumann (1964), the choice of a model for
mixing is not straightforward in the context of Bayesian games with large
type spaces. Fortunately, for our situation there is the very intuitive approach
suggested by Milgrom and Weber (1985). Specifically, a distributional strat-
egy for Player 1θ, θ ∈ Θ, is a probability distribution ψ1θ on T˜ ×M such that
the marginal distribution on T˜ induced by ψ1θ is identical to the marginal
distribution of t˜ on T˜ . A distributional strategy for Player 2m, m ∈ M , is
a probability distribution ψ2m on T ×R such that the marginal distribution
on T induced by ψ2m is identical to the marginal distribution of t on T .
Lemma 1. Without loss of generality, the distributional strategies of sender
and receiver can be represented by measurable functions
σ1 : Θ× T˜ → ∆(M),
σ2 : M × T → ∆(R),
where ∆(X) denotes the set of probability distributions over the (finite) set
X.
Proof. Consider the sender first. According to the assumptions made, the
marginal distribution of t˜ is atomless. Therefore, the cumulative distribution
function (cdf) of t˜ cannot possess any jumps. As a cdf of t˜ is the weighted
sum of the conditional cdfs for the corresponding finitely many messages in
M and since cdfs are nondecreasing, the cdfs of the messages cannot possess
jumps either. Hence, the cdfs for the messages are atomless and, therefore,
the corresponding distributions must possess densities. A similar argument
applies to the receiver. !
The equilibrium notion that will be employed is that of a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991a). A pure strategy for the sender
is a message m(θ, t˜) conditional on the sender’s global type, and on the
signal received about the receiver’s type. The corresponding mixed strategy
is denoted by σ1(θ, t˜). Similarly, a pure strategy for the receiver is an action
r(m, t) conditional on the message received, and conditional on the receiver’s
type. The corresponding mixed strategy is denoted by σ2(m, t). By abuse
of notation, the probability weights on the respective actions are denoted by
σ1(m, θ, t˜) and σ2(r,m, t).
At each information set, the receiver will form beliefs about the sender’s
global type. For all pairs (m, t), these beliefs are given by a function
µ(. |m, t) : Θ −→ [0, 1].
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We now can state the formal definition of a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Definition 1. A perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of a global signaling
game consists of a strategy profile σ∗ = (σ∗1,σ
∗
2) and beliefs µ(. |m, t) such
that
1. for all (m∗, θ, t˜), if σ∗1(m
∗, θ, t˜) > 0 then
m∗ ∈ argmax
m
∑
r
u1(m, r, θ) Pr(r |m; t˜),
where
Pr(r |m; t˜) :=
∫
σ∗2(r,m, t) dν(t | t˜)
2. for all (r∗,m, t), if σ∗2(r
∗,m, t) > 0, then
r∗ ∈ argmax
r
pi2(r |m, t),
where
pi2(r |m, t) :=
∑
θ
u2(r, θ, t) µ(θ |m, t).
3. for all (θ,m, t), if the information set of the receiver corresponding to
m and t is reached in equilibrium with strictly positive probability, i.e.,
if ∑
θ′
p(θ′) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, θ
′, t˜) dν(t˜ | t) > 0,
then
µ(θ |m, t) =
p(θ) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, θ, t˜) dν(t˜ | t)∑
θ′
p(θ′) ·
∫
σ∗1(m, θ′, t˜) dν(t˜ | t)
.
In this explorative study, we confine our attention to the following class
of signaling games based on the earlier example with M = {m,m} and
R = {r, r}. We replace the numeric payoffs by parameters as shown in
Figure 3, requiring that: - place
Figure
3
here -
a, b, c, d, x, y > 0.
Furthermore, we assume, that the possible types t of Player 2 are uniformly
distributed over an interval T := [−K,K] where K ( 0. Player 1’s signal t˜
is assumed to be uniform on [t− ε, t + ε], in particular T˜ = [−K − ε, K + ε].
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This implies that the posterior on t given t˜ is also uniform on [t− ε, t + ε] if
t˜ ∈ [−K + ε, K − ε] .5 Moreover, we require that K is sufficiently large not to
allow boundary effects to interfere with the argument, i.e. K ( max{x, y}.
We make one additional assumption:
c > a and b > d and p >
x
x + y
(A)
Assumption A ensures that both (m,m) and (m,m) are Perfect Bayesian
Equilibria in G0(0), the unperturbed game with t = 0. Moreover, it is not
difficult to check that under Assumption A, the equilibrium (m,m) is always
eliminated by the Intuitive Criterion, whereas (m,m) is not. The proof of
the next result follows closely the discussion of the example in Section 2.
Theorem 1. In any PBE, of the global sender types pool on m in response
to a signal t˜ close to zero.
Proof. See the appendix. !
The theorem shows that pooling on m cannot be an informationally stable
equilibrium of the underlying signaling game G0(0). However, note that the
theorem leaves open the question of existence. Without existence of a PBE
in the global game, a selection theory as suggested by Theorem 1 may have
no bite. This issue will be addressed in Section 5. It is convenient to discuss
uniqueness properties of the global equilibrium first.
4. Uniqueness
In Section 3 it was shown that, in any equilibrium of the global signaling
game, both global types of sender pool on m in a neighbourhood of t˜ = 0. In
this section, we show that, apart from a small area of types t and signals t˜
in which the transition between m and m of Player 1θ′s strategy takes place,
equilibrium strategies are unique up to beliefs off the equilibrium path. We
will refer to the remaining transition-area as “black hole.” In Section 6, when
we construct a concrete equilibrium for our example game from Section 2,
we will show that even within the black hole there is only little latitude for
strategy choices.
We will now give the arguments needed to sustain uniqueness of strategies
on the equilibrium path but outside the black hole for our example discussed
5For the argument to work, it suffices to assume that t˜ = t + δ, where δ is determined
according to some distribution on [−ε,+ε] that possess a strictly positive density.
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in Section 2. The general proof is slightly more technical and can be found
in the appendix.
In order to see that there is not much freedom of choice in the example game
if equilibrium is to be reached, we complement the results from Section 2
using the obvious dominance arguments. Doing this, we obtain that in any
equilibrium of the global game G(ε)
• 1θ has to choose m for all values t˜ < 0.8 and t˜ > 1;
• 1θ has to choose m for t˜ ≤ −1 and t˜ > 1, and message m for t˜ ∈
(−1, 0.8− 2ε);
• 2m has to choose r for t < 0.8, and r for t > 1;
• 2m has to choose r for t < −1 and r for t > 1.
The next step is to note that G(ε) exhibits a single crossing property. Specif-
ically, whatever the strategy of Player 2, a weak preference of Player 1θ for
m implies a strict preference of Player 1θ for message m. Hence, if in equi-
librium
µ(θ | m, t) > 0, then we must have µ(θ | m, t) ≤ p.
As we have seen in Section 2, for t ≥ 0.8, it is optimal for Player 2 to respond
with r if the proportion of low global types expected is at least 1− p. Thus,
Player 2 will play r against m for all types t > 0.8, whenever her information
set is reached. An immediate consequence of this is that Player 1θ will never
play m. This is because for all types t of Player 2 for which Player 1θ cannot
be sure that Player 2m will play r she can be sure that Player 2m will play
r.
Bearing this in mind, we now are able to extend the argument given given
in Section 2 to support m for Player 1θ given signals t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8 − 2ε) up
to values t˜ < 0.8. Loosely speaking, since Player 2m, given t > −1, would
always fight if her information set was reached, and since Player 1, for all
signals t˜ ∈ [0.8− 2ε, 0.8), will believe that
Pr(r |m; t˜) > 0.5,
it is optimal for Player 1θ to opt for m also for signals t˜ ∈ [0.8 − 2ε, 0.8).6
Thus, we have shown that in any equilibrium of G(ε) we must have that:
6More formally, we would have to argue again in terms of measurable fractions of Player
1θ since single types, being of measure 0, would not affect the beliefs of Player 2m. The
argument then follows similar lines as the one given to establish Fact 4 in Section 2 and
is left out at this place.
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Player 1θ plays m irrespective of her signal; Player 1θ plays m for t˜ ≤ −1
and t˜ > 1, and message m for t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8); Player 2m plays r for t < 0.8,
and r for t > 1; and Player 2m plays r for t < −1 and r for t > 1 and for all
types t ∈ [−1, 0.8] plays such that Player 1θ, given a signal t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8), is
deterred from sending message m.
The results obtained so far uniquely determine the behavior of players for
types t and signals t˜ outside of the interval (0.8, 1), allowing deviations only
on sets of measure zero. Theorem 2 summarises the results in more general
terms. See Figure 4 for illustration; notice that in case of the example game
we have x◦ = x = 1, y◦ = y = 1 and t◦ = t∗ = 0.8. - place
Figure
4
here -
Theorem 2. Take any equilibrium and consider the path, i.e. the distribu-
tion over end nodes, of this equilibrium. The conditional distribution, outside
the black hole, is unique.
Proof. See text above and the appendix for the general case. !
The Theorem shows that, while uniqueness of the equilibrium in the global
game cannot be satisfied, the differences of any two equilibria are restricted
to the area of bilateral mixing. In this area, as we have seen, uncertainty
about t and t˜ and the necessity of only perceived mixing (i.e. on average over
an interval) allows for some freedom of choice.
5. Existence
In a global signaling game, type spaces are continuous, and typically not all
local information sets are reached in equilibrium.7 As a consequence, exis-
tence of an equilibrium is not completely straightforward. The method of
proof that we choose is to make an “educated guess” concerning the equilib-
rium strategies for a wide range of type-signal pairs. In fact, as we have seen
above, this educated guess is essentially a necessary consequence of equilib-
rium conditions. For values of t and t˜ in the remaining black hole area, actual
strategies are difficult to pin down (see also Figure 4). However, it turns out
that the remaining game can be reduced to a static Bayesian game for which
existence results are available.
7Note that according to Definition 1, a local information set (m, t) of player 2 is reached
in equilibrium if the conditional probability that the message m is chosen in equilibrium,
conditional on |t˜− t| < ε, is strictly positive.
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In the following, we show how the needed argument works for the example
game presented in Section 2. We again confine our discussion to this par-
ticular example, since the technical detail of the general analysis do not add
much to the argument but are likely to detract the readers attention form
the main points. The technicalities can be found in the appendix.
To move on, consider the following incomplete candidate for an equilibrium
strategy based on the results from the previous section (cf. Figure 4):
• Player 1θ chooses m throughout.
• Player 1θ chooses message m for t˜ ≤ −1, message m for t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8),
and message m for t˜ > 1.
• Player 2m chooses r for t < 0.8, and r for t > 1.
• Player 2m chooses r for t < −1, and r for t ≥ −1.
This specification fully describes choices of actions for Players 1θ and 2m.
Moreover, it describes choices of action for Players 1θ and 2m outside of the
interval [0.8, 1]. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that µ(θ |m, t) = 1 for
all t ≥ −1 + ε to sustain the necessary off path play of Player 2m.8
To show that this candidate can be made a full equilibrium, we will now
construct a simultaneous-move global game G′ based on the unsolved black
hole part of the global signaling game. The equilibrium analysis of the game
to be constructed might be of some interest in itself as it complements the
analysis of Carlsson and van Damme (1993) in that it deals with the con-
sequences of the global games approach in situations when only one mixed
equilibrium exists for the unperturbed game.
There are two players, Player 1θ’ and Player 2m’. Before the game, Nature
determines the tuple (t˜′, t′), where the joint distribution of (t′, t˜′) is given by
the conditional distribution ν ′ that results when we impose the restriction
(t˜′, t′) ∈ B ×B,
where
B := [0.8− 2ε, 1 + 2ε].
8We have seen earlier that in any equilibrium Player 2m’s action has to be such that
Player 1θ, given t˜ ∈ (−1, 0.8), is deterred from sending message m. The assumption
µ(θ |m, t) = 1 for t ≥ −1 + ε guarantees that. It is satisfied anyway for all reached local
information sets (m, t) of Player 2 and is therefore not restrictive.
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It is not difficult to see that this conditional distribution is given by the
uniform distribution on the “thick diagonal”
{(t˜′, t′) s.t. ∣∣t′ − t˜′∣∣ ≤ ε}.
See Figure 5 for illustration. Strategies for Players 1θ’ and 2m’ are given by - place
Figure
5
here -
functions
σ′1 : B → ∆(M),
σ′2 : B → ∆(R).
The payoffs is this game are those accruing to the Players 1θ and 2m in the
global signaling game with the same signals t and t˜, given that the strategies
of Players 1θ and 2m are as described in the candidate equilibrium. The
payoff matrix of the game G′ is depicted Figure 6. - place
Figure
6
here -
For the general case, it is shown in the appendix that the conditions for the
existence theorem by Milgrom and Weber (1985) are satisfied, so that an
equilibrium in G′ exists. Moreover, as is also shown in the appendix, the
equilibrium strategies in G′ have to conform with the proposed incomplete
equilibrium strategies of the global signaling game in the regions of overlap.
Thus, we conclude:
Theorem 3. There exists an equilibrium in the global signaling game.
Proof. See the appendix. !
The reader will notice that Theorem 3 establishes existence in mixed strate-
gies only, which is sufficient for our purposes. While pure equilibria can be
constructed in some examples, we have been unable to prove general exis-
tence. In particular, the Purification Theorem of Milgrom and Weber (1986)
does not apply in our specific case, since types are not independent in global
signaling games.
Together with Theorem 1, the above result implies that a Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium in the signaling game in question is informationally stable if
and only if it is consistent with the Intuitive Criterion. Since the Intuitive
Criterion is based on the ideas of stability expressed in Kohlberg and Mertens
(1986), we expect that, similar to the results obtained by Carlsson and van
Damme (1993), in the generalised case the global games argument is even
more selective than the Intuitive Criterion.
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6. The example (cont.)
This section is entirely devoted to the example game for which we will com-
plement the incomplete equilibrium strategies from the previous section for
a specific range of ε values. We hope that the concreteness of the arguments
will further the understanding of the process going on behind the general
more abstract analysis. This seems of special interest in the present context
in which the impact of a global games approach to a game with a single
mixed Nash equilibrium is studied. As will become clear from the analysis,
there appears to be in fact little flexibility in defining equilibrium strategies
even in the black hole area.
To start with, one should notice that the equilibrium just proved to exist
must be one in which both of the players in the reduced game G′, i.e. Player
1θ and Player 2m, at least seemingly mix their actions within the black hole
area. The next argument will clarify what is meant by this.
We have seen earlier that, since in equilibrium Player 2m will play r when-
ever her information set is reached, it is optimal for Player 1θ to play m if
she assigns a probability larger than 1/2 to Player 2m playing r. On the
other hand, we know that for types t > t∗ Player 2 prefers to play r if she
assesses the probability of playing against Player 1θ to be at least 1 − p, or
even less as t increases. Putting things together, it becomes intuitive that
both players in equilibrium have to choose actions in such a way that the cor-
responding believes of their opponent always assign non-zero probability to
both possibilities. We will now move on to the construction of one particular
pair of equilibrium strategies; see Figure 7 for illustration.
It is instructive to consider the decision of Player 2m first. The aim is to
identify the conditions under which Player 2m chooses either r or r (or is
indifferent). Assume that Player 2m’s type is t ∈ [0.8, 1]. Then, by definition
of the information structure, Player 2m knows that Player 1θ has received
a signal t˜ ∈ [t− ε, t + ε]. Remember that the probability with which Player
1θ sends message m is given by σ1(m, θ, t˜). Thus, the probability Player 2m
will assign to the event that a Player 1θ of some type t˜ ∈ [t− ε, t + ε] sends
the message m is given by
λ(t) :=
∫ t+ε
t−ε
σ1(m, θ, t˜)dt˜.
Let β(t) := µ(θ | m, t) denote the posterior probability that a Player 2m of
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type t assigns to the global sender type θ = θ. Then, by Bayes’ rule,
β(t) =
Pr(θ = θ and m = m)
Pr(θ = θ and m = m) + Pr(θ = θ and m = m)
=
0.1 · (1− λ(t))
0.1 · (1− λ(t)) + 0.9
=
1− λ(t)
10− λ(t) . (2)
Consequently, Player 2m is indifferent if and only if
(1 + t) · β(t) + (t− 1) · (1− β(t)) = 0.
Rearranging gives
β(t) =
1− t
2
. (3)
Equating (2) and (3) yields
λ∗(t) = 10− 18
1 + t
.
This formula identifies the “indifference curve” for Player 2m. It is depicted
as a dotted convex-shaped curve reaching over the interval [0.8, 1] in the
bottom part of Figure 7. The next lemma is an immediate consequence of
the above discussion. - place
Figure
7
here -
Lemma 2. Whenever λ(t) < λ∗(t), Player 2m chooses r; whenever λ(t) >
λ∗(t), Player 2m chooses r.
Proof. See text above. !
In the sequel, a solution will be offered where at the left boundary, i.e. for
t close to 0.8, we have λ(t) > λ∗(t), and at the right boundary, i.e. for t
close to 1, we have λ(t) < λ∗(t). Since beliefs λ(t) must be continuous as a
consequence of integrating out the noise in the signal to Player 1, there will be
a non-empty set of intersection points where λ(t) = λ∗(t). For concreteness,
we will focus on the case of exactly three intersection points
0.8 < t1 < t2 < t3 < 1,
where
tk = t0 + kε,
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and t0 is a constant. Moreover, we assume that Player 2m’s strategy is a
step function in the black hole. Specifically, Player 2m chooses r for signals
t < t1 and for t ∈ (t2, t3); she chooses r for signals t ∈ (t1, t2) and for t > t3.
We now turn to Player 1θ. As her signal of Player 2’s type is noisy, Player
1θ’s belief is an integral over the actions chosen by Player 2m. Given the
assumptions made about Player 2m, we get a piecewise linear belief (as
depicted in Figure 7), that assigns probability smaller than 1/2 to r for
signals t˜ < t1, probability 1/2 to r in the interval [t1, t3], and probability
larger than 1/2 to r for values t˜ > t3. From the payoff structure, we deduce
that Player 1θ chooses m for signals t˜ < t1, and m for signals t˜ > t3. In
the interval [t1, t3], however, Player 1θ
′s strategy must be chosen in such a
way that it induces the desired shape of the belief function λ(t). Proving the
proposition below requires the construction of a strategy for Player 1θ that
integrates into a belief λ(t) for Player 2m such that the difference λ(t)−λ∗(t)
always has the desired sign. As will be shown in the appendix one possible
strategy for Player 1θ is to play m with probability
σ1(m, θ, t˜) =
36ε
(1 + t˜− ε)2
for t˜ ∈ [t1, t3]. This will provide the desired fixed point of the mapping
starting at the top (or any other) segment of Figure 7, i.e. Player 2’s strategy,
and running through all the parts of the figure before returning to the strategy
of Player 2 again.
Proposition 1. The strategy profile described above is an equilibrium in the
global signaling game for ε ∈ ( 120 , 115).
Proof. See the appendix.
The main conclusion from this Proposition is that even on the equilibrium
path uniqueness of the global equilibrium cannot be guaranteed, at least not
within the black hole. To see why, note that there is some freedom to specify
the belief curve λ(t). One could, for example, have λ(t) closer to λ∗(t) at the
left boundary, levelling the difference out on the way to t1.
As a further point note that in the constructed equilibrium only beliefs are
close to those of the mixed equilibrium in the unperturbed game. This is
because, as we have seen, players must not assign probability 1 to any pure
action in the black hole in equilibrium. Thus, players’ equilibrium choices
must be perceived as mixing over any interval of length 2ε. This in turn
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implies that in any interval of length 2ε, the curve representing players’
beliefs have to cross the indifference curve of the unperturbed game at least
once. Continuity of beliefs and the frequency of strategy changes needed,
therefore, explain why at least beliefs have to converge as ε goes to zero.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have explored the consequences of applying the global games
methodology to the theory of equilibrium selection in signaling games. It
turned out that predictions of Cho and Kreps’ standard refinement can be
replicated for an economically relevant class of signaling games by introducing
additional uncertainty, on the part of the sender, about the utility function
of the receiver. We have argued that this specific assumption of additional
uncertainty is in some circumstances easier to defend than alternative jus-
tifications. All in all, we hope to have convinced the reader that applying
global games techniques also to signaling games is a valuable approach with
potentially interesting economic applications.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The proof below follows the line of argument outlined
in Section 1. By simple dominance, we obtain that for t < −x, Player 2m
chooses action r. Assume now that for some t+, it has been shown that for
any t < t+, Player 2m replies with r. Denote the probability Player 1 assigns
to Player 2 responding to message m with response r, conditional on her
signal t˜, by Pr(r | m; t˜). Then Player 1θ chooses m irrespective of her beliefs
about 2m’s choice of action if
Pr(r |m; t˜) · d + (1− Pr(r |m; t˜))(b + d) > b.
This is equivalent to Pr(r |m; t˜) < d/b. However, since the noise is uniformly
distributed, Player 1θ will assign probability Pr(r |m; t˜) < d/b to the event
that 2m chooses r, for all
t˜ < t+ − ε(1− 2d
b
). (4)
Thus, we have shown the following assertion. Assume that for all t < t+,
Player 2m responds with r. Then for any t˜ satisfying (4), Player 1θ chooses
m. Consider Player 2m again. Assume that Player 1θ chooses message m
for all values t˜ < t+ for some value t∗. Consider the case in which Player
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2m is of type t < t+ + ε. Given that t′ is close to t+, Player 2 knows that
the probability of Player 1 receiving a signal t˜ < t+ is strictly positive. By
assumption, Player 1 chooses m for values t˜ < t+. Thus, Player 2’s posterior
on m assigns some strictly positive probability to θ = θ. Moreover, given t˜,
whenever 1θ has a weak preference for m, 1θ has a strict preference for m
given the same signal t˜. Hence, the posterior of facing a global type θ on
message m cannot fall below the prior probability p of the high type:
µ(θ | m, t) ≥ p.
Therefore, the expected payoff for 2m, denoted by pi2(. | m, t), from r is
bounded from above by
pi2(r | m, t) ≤ (1− p)(t + x) + p(t− y).
However, even this upper bound falls below the zero payoff from r whenever
t < t∗ := py − (1− p)x.
So we have shown: Assume that 1θ plays m for all t˜ < t+ < t∗ − ε. Then
2m chooses r for all t < t∗ + ε. Putting the above facts together delivers
the result that for any signal t˜ < t+, Player 1θ chooses m. Note also that,
because of assumption A, we have t+ > 0, for sufficiently small ε. This
proves that pooling on m is not an informationally stable equilibrium of the
signaling game G0(0).
Next, we will consider Player 1 again. We know that r is strictly dominant
for Player 2 if t > y. Expected payoffs pi1(. | θ, t˜) for Player 1θ are given by
pi1(m | θ, t˜) = Pr(r |m; t˜) · a + Pr(r |m; t˜) · (a + c)
pi1(m | θ, t˜) = Pr(r |m; t˜) · 0 + Pr(r |m; t˜) · c.
Thus, message m is optimal for Player 1θ if
a
c
+ Pr(r |m; t˜) < Pr(r |m; t˜).
Player 1θ plays m if she assigns at least probability a/c to the event that
Player 2m will respond with r. To show now that in equilibrium also 1θ has
to choose m for t˜ = 0, there are two things to check. First of all, we need
that t∗ is larger than zero, which, as noted earlier, is equivalent to requiring
p >
x
x + y
.
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This ensures that, at least for small values of ε, the high type of Player
1 send m in a 2ε-neighbourhood of t˜ = 0 and that indeed Player 2m will
respond with r for types t ∈ U2ε := [−2ε, 2ε]. Now, given this, assume as
in the example that there is an equilibrium in which 1θ sends m in a set U
of strictly positive measure, where U is contained in an ε∗-neighbourhood of
zero, with
ε∗ ≤ 1
2
(1− a
c
) · ε.
Next consider Player 2 given type t ∈ U2ε and observing m. In equilibrium
Player 2 has to assign positive posterior probability to m. Using Fact 3.6,
Player 2 has to believe with probability 1 that this action was chosen by
a Player 1 of global type θ. Thus, Player 2m has to respond with r with
probability 1 for all types t ∈ [−(ε+ ε∗), ε+ ε∗] . This in turn leads Player 1
to believe that given t˜ ∈ U
Pr(r |m; t˜) > a
c
.
Therefore, having the above optimality condition in mind, we can conclude
that 1θ sends message m. This proves: In any equilibrium, the global type θ
of Player 1 sends m in a small neighbourhood of t˜ = 0, given ε is sufficiently
small. Moreover the beliefs of 1θ have to be such that she assigns a probability
larger than or equal to a/c to Player 2m responding with r. This completes
the proof. !
Proof of Theorem 2. To obtain the general result, note that, due to the
payoff structure, the main special feature of the example game G(ε) is that
especially for Player 1θ (but also for Player 1θ) cut off probabilities always
are at 50%. Consequently, whenever Player 2’s behaviour is specified up
to some type t+ Player 1θ′s cut off signal t˜+ will be equal to t+ since the
most extreme that can happen is a complete change in behaviour (leading
to a 50/50 assessment). However, as we have seen in the general proof of
Theorem 1, it may suffice for Player 1θ to expect a smaller (or larger) share
of types of Player 2 to play a different action in the general case. Specifically,
this share was shown to be given by the fraction a/c. Moreover, the single
crossing property used for the argument in the specific example still exists
in the general case. Thus, if we define switching points accordingly, i.e. if we
define:
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t∗ := py − (1− p)x,
x◦ := x + ε(1− 2a
c
),
y◦ := y + ε(1− 2a
c
),
t◦ := t∗ + ε(1− 2a
c
),
and follow exactly the same lines of argument as in Section 4, we get that in
any equilibrium of the generalised game we must have:
• 1θ plays m irrespective of her signal;
• 1θ plays m for t˜ ≤ −x◦ and t˜ > y◦, and message m for t˜ ∈ (−x◦, t◦);
• 2m plays r for t < t∗, and r for t > y;
• 2m plays r for t < −x and r for t > y and for all types t ∈ [−x, t∗]
plays such that Player 1θ, given a signal t˜ ∈ (−x◦, t◦), is deterred from
sending message m.
Obviously, for the example game G(ε), we get t∗ = 0.8, x◦ = 1, y◦ = 1, and
t◦ = t∗ = 0.8 corresponding to our earlier results. !
Proof of Theorem 3. The general proof has three steps, the outline of
which reads as follows. We start by making the same kind of educated guess
about the equilibrium strategies outside the black hole as for the example
game and again reduce the game to a two-by-two normal form game which
on its own - as we show - is amenable to the Milgrom/Weber results. Sec-
ondly, we show that the suggested strategies must actually conform with the
Milgrom/Weber solution for the reduced game in the the regions of overlap.
Finally, we prove that the resulting strategies for the global signaling game
constitute a perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Step 1. Since, as noted earlier, in the general case switching points are
different, we again use the constants t∗, x◦, y◦ and t◦ as defined in the gen-
eralised proof of Theorem 2. Next, we propose the incomplete candidate for
an equilibrium strategy based on the findings in the earlier general uniqueness
discussion (cf. Figure 4):
• Player 1θ chooses m throughout.
• Player 1θ chooses message m for t˜ ≤ −x◦, message m for t˜ ∈ (−x◦, t◦),
and message m for t˜ > y◦.
• Player 2m chooses r for t < t∗, and r for t > y.
• Player 2m chooses r for t < −x, and r for t ≥ −x.
This specification fully describes choices of actions for Players 1θ and 2m.
Moreover, it describes choices of action for Players 1θ for signals t˜ /∈ [t◦, y◦]
and for Player 2m for types t /∈ [t∗, y]. Also, we again assume that µ(θ |m, t) =
1 for all t ≥ x◦ + ε to guarantee the necessary off path play of Player 2m.9
The corresponding simultaneous-move Bayesian game G′ between Player 1θ’
and Player 2m’ follows the same steps as in the example. First, Nature
determines the tuple (t˜′, t′) according to the conditional distribution ν ′ that
results when we impose the restriction
(t˜′, t′) ∈ B ×B,
where
B := [t∗ − 2ε, y + 2ε].
The conditional distribution again is uniform on the “thick diagonal”
{(t˜′, t′) s.t. ∣∣t′ − t˜′∣∣ ≤ ε}.
Strategies for Players 1’ and 2m’ are given by
σ′1 : B → ∆(M),
σ′2 : B → ∆(A).
The payoffs of this game are those accruing to the Players 1 and 2m in the
global signaling game with the same signals t and t˜, given that the strategies
of Players 1θ and 2m are as described in the candidate equilibrium.
Lemma A1. The constructed two-by-two game G′ satisfies the requirements
of the Milgrom Weber theorem. Thus, there exists an equilibrium of G′.
Proof. To apply the general existence theorem of Milgrom and Weber
(1985), we have to check for equicontinuous payoffs and absolute continu-
ous information. The former is satisfied since all action spaces are finite.
The latter holds since, as ε > 0, the conditional distribution ν ′ is absolute
9As noted earlier, this assumption is not restrictive.
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continuous with respect to the product uniform distribution on B × B, as
any null set in B×B of the latter clearly has measure 0 also under ν ′. Hence,
there exists an equilibrium in distributional strategies in G′. !
The next step is to show that we can use the equilibrium in G′ to construct
an equilibrium in the global signaling game. We specify strategies as fol-
lows: Players 1θ and 2m choose the strategies described in the candidate
equilibrium; Players 1θ and 2m, however, choose the actions identified in
the candidate profile only for signals and types outside the intervals [t◦, y◦]
and [t∗, y], respectively; Player 1θ, for signals t˜ ∈ [t◦, y◦], and Player 2m,
for t ∈ [t∗, y], choose the (mixed) actions specified by the Milgrom/Weber
equilibrium.
Step 2. We will first check that the Milgrom/Weber equilibrium conforms
with the candidate strategies in the regions of overlap. Refer to Figures
3 and 5 for illustration. Consider first Player 2m. We have to show that
the Milgrom/Weber equilibrium involves playing r for t ∈ [t∗ − 2ε, t∗), and
playing r for t ∈ (y, y + 2ε]. Assume first t ∈ [t∗ − 2ε, t∗). Since Player
1θ chooses m throughout, a payoff comparison shows that Player 2m’ will
necessarily choose r whenever
(1− p)(t + x) + p(t− y) > 0.
This, however, is equivalent to t < t∗. Thus, the Milgrom/Weber equilibrium
involves playing r for all t ∈ [t∗ − 2ε, t∗). Assume now that t ∈ (y, y + 2ε].
Since action r is dominant for Player 2m’ for t > y, the Milgrom/Weber
equilibrium involves playing r for t ∈ (y, y + 2ε].
Next, consider Player 1θ. A payoff comparison shows that Player 1’ neces-
sarily chooses message m if
Pr(r |m; t˜) · c > a. (5)
This is certainly satisfied for all t˜ ∈ [t∗−2ε, t∗− ε], because for those signals,
as shown above, Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1. For the remaining values of t˜ ∈ (t∗ − ε, t◦),
a short calculation shows that (5) is necessarily satisfied whenever t˜ < t◦, by
definition of t◦. Consider now the case t˜ ∈ (y◦, y + 2ε]. Player 1’ necessarily
chooses message m if
a > Pr(r |m; t˜) · c.
This is certainly the case when t˜ ∈ [y + ε, y +2ε], because due to dominance
it must hold Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1. For t˜ ∈ (y◦, y + ε), the optimality of m fol-
lows again from a short calculation. This shows that the Milgrom/Weber
equilibrium and the candidate strategies conform in the intervals of overlap.
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Step 3. Next, we prove that the strategy profile constructed in Section 4
indeed constitutes a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. We start with Player
1θ. Whatever the signal t˜ of Player 1θ, it must either hold that Player
Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1 (for low values of t˜) or that Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1 (for high values
of t˜), or both. In either case, message m is the optimal choice for 1θ.
To move on, consider Player 2m. Given that 1θ plays m throughout, any
information set for Player 2m is reached, and it must always hold that
µ(θ | m, t) ≥ p. A payoff comparison shows then that Player 2m will neces-
sarily choose r when
(1− p)(t + x) + p(t− y) > 0.
This condition, however, is equivalent to t < t∗. On the other hand, for t > y,
action r is dominant for Player 2m. We can therefore restrict attention to
values t ∈ [t∗, y]. To show that the action prescribed by σ′2 is optimal, it
suffices to prove that σ′1 conforms with the candidate strategy for Player 1θ
in the intervals of overlap [t∗− 2ε, t∗) and [y, y +2ε]. But this has been done
is step 2 of the proof.
Next, consider Player 1θ. For low values of t˜, i.e., for t˜ < t∗ − ε, we have
Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1. In this case, message m is optimal if and only if t˜ ≤ −x◦,
which is consistent with the candidate strategy. For very high values of t˜, i.e.
for t˜ > y + ε, we have Pr(r |m; t˜) = Pr(r |m; t˜) = 1. In this case, message m
is optimal for 1θ. So we can restrict attention to the interval [t∗ − ε, y + ε].
However, for these values the optimality of Player 1θ’s strategy follows from
the optimality property of the strategy of Player 1θ in the Milgrom/Weber
equilibrium.
Finally, consider Player 2m. A short calculation using the definition of x◦
shows that the candidate strategy for Player 2m is optimal. This completes
the proof of Theorem 3. !
Proof of Proposition 1. We have to construct a strategy ρ(s) := σ1(m, θ, s)
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for Player 1θ that satisfies the following four sign conditions
1
2ε
∫ t+ε
t−ε
ρ(s)ds ≥ λ∗(t) for t ≤ t0 + ε (6)
1
2ε
∫ t+ε
t−ε
ρ(s)ds ≤ λ∗(t) for t ∈ [t0 + ε, t0 + 2ε] (7)
1
2ε
∫ t+ε
t−ε
ρ(s)ds ≥ λ∗(t) for t ∈ [t0 + 2ε, t0 + 3ε] (8)
1
2ε
∫ t+ε
t−ε
ρ(s)ds ≤ λ∗(t) for t ∈ [t0 + 3ε, t0 + 4ε] . (9)
In the sequel, we will re-formulate these conditions. Write
hk := λ
∗(t0 + k · ε).
Since ρ(s) = 0 for s < t0 + ε, we may rewrite (6) as∫ t
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds ≥ 2ε · λ∗(t− ε) for t ∈ [t0 + ε, t0 + 2ε] .
We know that we need to have
1
2ε
∫ t0+3ε
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds = h2
and that ρ(s) = 1 for s ≥ t0 + 3ε. Hence, condition (8) is equivalent to
1
2ε
∫ t−ε
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds
=
1
2ε
{
∫ t0+3ε
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds +
∫ t+ε
t0+3ε
ρ(s)ds−
∫ t+ε
t−ε
ρ(s)ds}
≤ h2 + t + ε− (t0 + 3ε)
2ε
− λ∗(t)
for t ∈ [t0 + 2ε, t0 + 3ε]. Replacing t by t + ε,we obtain∫ t
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds ≤ 2ε · h2 + (t− t0 − ε)− 2ε · λ∗(t + ε)
for t ∈ [t0 + ε, t0 + 2ε].
Now, putting the reformulated conditions together, we can give an upper and
a lower bound for the integral of ρ(s) for t ∈ [t0 + ε, t0 + 2ε]:
2ε · λ∗(t− ε) ≤
∫ t
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds ≤ 2ε · h2 + (t− t0 − ε)− 2ε · λ∗(t + ε). (A)
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Similarly, using (7) and (9) we find the following condition for values of t in
[t0 + 2ε, t0 + 3ε] :
2ε·h3+(t−t0−2ε)−2ε·λ∗(t+ε) ≤
∫ t
t0+2ε
ρ(s)ds ≤ 2ε·λ∗(t−ε)−ε·2h1. (B)
The next step before we can construct an action ρ(s) is to check wether
both A and B are consistent. Starting with condition A, straightforward
computations - beginning with the corner points and then showing that the
result extends to the whole interval - show that this condition is satisfied
for ε- values satisfying 1/18 ≤ ε ≤ 9/100. Condition B can be shown to
be generally satisfied by checking the corner points first and then using the
concavity of λ∗ and the result stated in Lemma A2 below.
Now we can construct an action profile ρ(s) for Player 1θ. In the interval
[t0 + ε, t0 + 2ε] we simply take the lower bound of the constraint and try to
stick to it, i.e. try to stay on λ∗(.). Thus we get
2ε · λ∗(t− ε) =
∫ t
t0+ε
ρ(s)ds
Taking derivatives gives
2ε · ∂λ
∗
∂t
(t− ε) = ρ(t).
Proceeding in the same way with the upper bound on the left-hand side of
condition B on the interval [t0 + ε, t0 + 3ε] , we obtain
ρ(t˜) =

0 for t˜ ≤ t0 + ε
36ε
(1+t˜−ε)2 for t˜ ∈ [t0 + ε, t0 + 3ε]
1 for t˜ ≥ t0 + 2ε
It only remains to check that ρ(t˜) < 1, i.e. if
36ε
(1 + t˜− ε)2 ≤ 1
If we use that (1 + t˜− ε)2 > (1.8)2 we obtain:
36
1.82
ε =
20
1.8
ε =
10
0.9
ε ≤ 1.
This holds since we know that ε ≤ 0.9/10 by assumption. !
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Lemma A2. The parameter t0 is implicitly characterized by the equation
ρ∗(t1)− ρ∗(t2) + ρ∗(t3) = 1
2
.
Proof of Lemma A2. This is almost an immediate consequence of the
definition of ρ∗(.). Write ρ(s) := σ1(m, θ, s). Then
ρ∗(t1)− ρ∗(t2) + ρ∗(t3)
=
1
2ε
{
∫ t2
t0
ρ(s)ds−
∫ t3
t1
ρ(s)ds +
∫ t4
t2
ρ(s)ds}
=
1
2ε
{
∫ t1
t0
ρ(s)ds +
∫ t4
t3
ρ(s)ds} = 1
2
.
This proves the Lemma. !
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